This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ‡ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (Eur J Oper Res 216:208-213, 2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are fully rational, the serial rule Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, University of the Basque Country, L. Agirre 83,
Introduction
Consider a multilateral bargaining situation with one distinguished player (the most senior creditor in the bankruptcy case, the chair of a committee, the manager of a …rm...). The distinguished player negotiates bilaterally with each of the other players. Negotiations are constrained by a fairness or justice principle that is commonly accepted in society and can be enforced (possibly by an external court). Players are assumed to be sel…sh, hence they only appeal to this principle when it is in their material interest to do so. To what extent does the global agreement re ‡ect the bilateral principle? In Dagan et al. (1997) the answer is that the bilateral principle completely determines the outcome: if a particular bankruptcy rule can be enforced in the bilateral comparison between the proposer and each responder, the outcome is the same bankruptcy rule applied to the case of n creditors. 1 Dagan et al.'s paper focuses on bankruptcy games, hence their justice principles are also restricted to this class. The question arises of what the appropriate justice principle should be for general TU games. In this paper we use the (restricted) standard solution of a reduced game between the two players. The idea behind this principle is that each of the two players gains (or loses) the same amount with respect to an alternative situation in which the two players cannot cooperate with each other (unless this would result in a negative payo¤ for one of the players, in which case this player gets zero).
Using this bilateral principle, Arin and Feltkamp (2007) studied the bargaining procedure in another class of games with a distinguished player, namely games with a veto player. A veto player is a player whose cooperation is essential in order for a coalition to generate value. Games with a veto player arise naturally in economic applications. Examples include a production economy with one landowner and many landless peasants (Shapley and Shubik (1967) ), an innovator trading information about a technological innovation with several producers (Muto (1986) , Muto et al. (1989) , Driessen et al. (1992) ) and hierarchical situations where a top player's permission is necessary in order for a project to be developed (Gilles et al. 1992 ). Arin and Feltkamp (2007) found that the equilibria of this bargaining procedure are not always e¢ cient: the proposer may be strictly better-o¤ by proposing an allocation that does not exhaust the total available payo¤.
In the present paper, we modify the above procedure by allowing the proposer to make a …xed number of sequential proposals, so that players can continue bargaining over the remainder if the …rst proposal did not exhaust the value of the grand coalition. Each period results in a partial agreement, and then a new TU game is constructed where the values of the coalitions take into account the agreements reached so far; the …nal outcome is the sum of all partial agreements. We assume that the number of available bargaining periods T is at least as large as the number of players n. In order to analyze this multiperiod game, we start by a simpli…ed model in which responders behave myopically, that is, we initially assume that responders consider each period in isolation, accepting or rejecting the current proposal without anticipating the e¤ects of their decision on future periods. The proposer is assumed to behave rationally, taking into account the e¤ect of his actions on future periods and also taking into account that the responders behave myopically. We refer to this kind of strategy pro…le as a myopic best response equilibrium.
It turns out that all myopic best response equilibria are e¢ cient and lead to the same outcome, which is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) . This solution concept is based on the idea that the strength of player i can be measured by the maximum amount a coalition can obtain without player i, denoted by d i . Since it is impossible for any coalition to obtain a payo¤ above d i without i's cooperation, player i can be viewed as having a veto right over v(N ) d i . The serial rule divides v(N ) into segments, and each segment is equally divided between the players that have a veto right over it.
We then turn to the analysis of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes and show that they may di¤er from the serial rule. The order of moves may be such that the proposer is able to hide some payo¤ from a stronger player with the cooperation of a weaker player: the proposal faced by the stronger player is not too favorable for the proposer so that the stronger player cannot challenge it, but later on a weak player rejects the proposal and transfers some payo¤ to the proposer; the weak player may have an incentive to do so because of the e¤ect of this agreement on future periods. However, if the order of moves is such that stronger players have the last word in the sense that they respond to the proposal after weaker ones, the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is the serial rule. Hence, myopic and rational behavior of the responders lead to the same outcome in this case.
Preliminaries

TU games
A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is a pair (N; v), where N is a …nite set of n elements and v : 2 N ! R is a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subsets of N with v(;) = 0: Elements of N are called players and the real-valued function v the characteristic function of the game. Any subset S of the player set N is called a coalition. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted by jSj. In this work we will only consider games where all coalitions have nonnegative worth and the grand coalition is e¢ cient, that is, 0 v(S) v(N ) for all S N:
A payo¤ allocation is represented by a vector x 2 R n ; where x i is the payo¤ assigned by x to player i. We denote P A (single-valued) solution on a class of games is a function that associates with every game (N; v) in a feasible allocation (N; v) in R N . The solution satis…es the aggregate monotonicity property (Meggido, 1974) on the class of games if the following holds: for all v; w 2 such that v(S) = w(S) for all S 6 = N and v(N ) < w(N ), then i (N; v) i (N; w) for all i 2 N . Increasing the value of the grand coalition never leads to a payo¤ decrease for any of the players.
The core of a game is the set of imputations that cannot be blocked by any coalition, i.e.
A game with a nonempty core is called a balanced game. A player i is a veto player if v(S) = 0 for all coalitions where player i is not present. A game v is a veto-rich game if it has at least one veto player and the set of imputations is nonempty. A balanced game with at least one veto player is called a veto balanced game. Note that balancedness is a relatively weak property for games with a veto player, since it only requires v(N ) v(S) for all S N:
Given a game (N; v) and a feasible allocation x, the excess of a coalition S at x is de…ned as e(S; x) := v(S) x(S). Its mirror concept, the satisfaction of a coalition S at x, is de…ned as f (S; x) := x(S) v(S). We de…ne f ij (x; (N; v)) as the minimum satisfaction of a coalition that contains i but not j. f ij (x; (N; v)) := min
If there is no confusion we write f ij (x) instead of f ij (x; (N; v)): The higher f ij (x), the better i is treated by the allocation x in comparison with j. The kernel can be de…ned as the set of imputations that satisfy the following bilateral kernel conditions:
Note that, if j is a veto player, f ij (x) = x i . 2 Arin and Feltkamp (1997) show that the kernel is a single point for vetorich games. In other words, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 ) and the kernel coincide.
2.2 One-period bargaining (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007) Given a veto balanced game (N; v) where player 1 is a veto player and an order on the set of the remaining players, we will de…ne an extensive-form game associated to the TU game and denote it by G(N; v). The game has n stages and in each stage only one player takes an action. In the …rst stage, a veto player announces a proposal x 1 that belongs to the set of feasible and nonnegative allocations of the game (N; v): In the next stages the responders accept or reject sequentially. If a player, say i; accepts the proposal x and for the next stage the proposal x s coincides with the proposal at s 1; that is x s 1 : If player i rejects the proposal, this rejection is understood as an appeal for the bilateral fairness principle to be enforced. A two-person TU game is constructed by applying the de…nition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game 3 on the set f1; ig given x s 1 , and player i receives as payo¤ the restricted standard solution 4 of this 2 An equivalent de…nition of the kernel is based on the mirror concept of f ij , which is the surplus of i against j at x (terminology of Maschler, 1992) , s ij (x) := max S:i2S N nfjg fv(S) x(S)g. The kernel is the set of imputations such that s ij (x) > s ji (x) implies x j = v(j). We found it more convenient to work with f ij (:) rather than s ij (:). 
See also Peleg (1986) . 4 The standard solution of a two-person TU game v gives player i = 1; 2 the amount
. The restricted standard solution coincides with the standard solution except when the standard solution gives a negative payo¤ to one of the players, in which case this player receives 0 and the other player receives v(1; 2).
two-person game, unless this would result in a negative payo¤ in which case i receives 0. Once all the responders have played and consequently have received their payo¤s the payo¤ of the proposer is also determined as x n 1 .
Formally, the resulting outcome of playing the game can be described by the following algorithm.
Input : a veto balanced game (N; v) with a veto player, player 1, and an order on the set of remaining players (responders). Output : a feasible and nonnegative allocation x n (N; v):
1. Start with stage 1. Player 1 makes a feasible and nonnegative proposal x 1 (not necessarily an imputation): The superscript denotes at which stage the allocation emerges as the proposal in force.
2. In the next stage the …rst responder (say, player 2) says yes or no to the proposal. If he says yes he receives the payo¤ x 
:
In this game we assume that the con ‡ict between the proposer and a responder is solved bilaterally. In the event of con ‡ict, the players face a two-person TU game that shows the strength of each player given that the rest of the responders are passive. The responder then receives the restricted standard solution of this game, which is based on the idea that both players should gain or lose equally with respect to the alternative situation in which negotiations break down (subject to the limited liability constraint that player i cannot get a negative payo¤).
The f ij values play an important role in this bargaining procedure as the following lemma illustrates.
Lemma 1 (Arin and Feltkamp, (2007) ) Suppose player k is facing the proposal x s 1 at stage s. If k rejects the proposal: 1. Player k receives the payo¤ y k = max 0;
Proof. 1. Note that v f1;kg 
. In the second case we have
. The set of pure strategies in this game is relatively simple. Player 1's strategy consists of the initial proposal x 1 , which must be feasible and nonnegative. A pure strategy for the responder who moves at stage s is a function that assigns "yes" or "no" to each possible proposal x s 1 and each possible history of play. Players are assumed to be sel…sh, hence player i seeks to maximize x n i .
Nash equilibrium outcomes of the one-period game
The set of bilaterally balanced allocations for player i is
while the set of optimal allocations for player i in the set F i (N; v) is de…ned as follows:
In the class of veto balanced games, F i (N; v) is a nonempty and compact set for all i, thus the set B i (N; v) is nonempty. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Recall that, as shown in lemma 1, the restricted standard solution that is applied if player i rejects a proposal in stage s results in f 1i (x s ) = f i1 (x s ), unless this would mean a negative payo¤ for player i, in which case
Hence, rejection of a proposal leads to a payo¤ redistribution between 1 and i until the bilateral kernel condition is satis…ed between the two players. It is in player i's interest to reject any proposal with f 1i (x s 1 ) > f i1 (x s 1 ) and to accept all other proposals. Since player i rejects proposals with
, the proposal in force after i has the move always satis…es
. Subsequent actions by players moving after i can only reduce f 1i (:
Conversely, player 1 can achieve any bilaterally balanced payo¤ vector by proposing it. Player 1 then maximizes his own payo¤ under the constraint that the …nal allocation has to be bilaterally balanced.
The nucleolus is a natural candidate to be an equilibrium outcome since it is the only e¢ cient allocation that satis…es the bilateral kernel conditions in this class of games, and indeed the nucleolus is always in F 1 (N; v). However, it is not necessarily in B 1 (N; v). Instead, Arin and Feltkamp (2007) show that the proposer may be better-o¤ by proposing an ine¢ cient allocation, as the following example illustrates: The nucleolus of this game is (4; 2; 2; 2; 2). However, player 1 can do better by proposing the ine¢ cient allocation (8; 0; 0; 0; 0). This ine¢ cient allocation would emerge as the …nal outcome since it satis…es the bilateral principle. Suppose player 1 sets x 1 = (8; 0; 0; 0; 0) and player 2 rejects the proposal. Player 1 can form a coalition with the other three players and pay them 0, hence v f1;2g
The standard solution of the reduced game allocates 0 to player 2 and leaves the proposal unchanged, x 2 = (8; 0; 0; 0; 0). Note that allocation (8; 0; 0; 0; 0) is the nucleolus of a game w that coincides with v except that w(N ) = x(N ) = 8. Since the nucleolus does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity for the class of veto balanced games, the proposer may be better-o¤ by proposing the nucleolus of a di¤erent game where the grand coalition has a lower value.
3 A new game: sequential proposals
The model
We extend the previous model to T periods where T is assumed to be at least as large as the number of players n. The proposer can now make T sequential proposals, and each proposal is answered by the responders as in the previous model. We will denote a generic period as t and a generic stage as s. The proposal that emerges at the end of period t and stage s is denoted by x t;s , and the proposal that emerges at the end of period t is denoted by x t := x t;n . Given a veto balanced game with a proposer and an order on the set of responders (which may be di¤erent for di¤erent periods) we will construct an extensive form game, denoted by G T (N; v). Formally, the resulting outcome of playing the game can be described by the following algorithm.
Input : a veto balanced game (N; v) with a veto player, player 1, as proposer, and a rule that determines the order of the remaining players (responders). This rule may be di¤erent for di¤erent periods, and may depend on the history of play. Formally, let H t denote the set of all possible histories of play up to the end of period t. For period 1, the ordering of the responders is a predetermined permutation 1 : N nf1g ! N nf1g. For t > 1, we have a collection of permutations indexed by the history of play in previous periods t h t 1 h t 1 2H t 1 , where t h t 1 : N nf1g ! N nf1g is the order of the responders in period t given history of play h t 1 . Output : a feasible and nonnegative allocation x:
1. Start with period 1. Given a veto balanced TU game (N; v) and the order on the set of responders 1 corresponding to period 1, players play the game G(N; v). The outcome of this period determines the veto balanced TU game for the second period, denoted by (N; v 2;x 1 ), where v 2;x 1 (S) := max f0; min fv(N ) x 1 (N ); v(S) x 1 (S)gg and x 1 is the …nal outcome obtained in the …rst period. 6 Note that by construction, the game (N; v 2;x 1 ) is a veto balanced game where player 1 is a veto player. Then go to the next step. The superscripts in the characteristic function denote at which period and after which outcome the game is considered as the game in force. If no confusion arises we write v 2 instead of v 2;x 1 :
2. In period t (t T ), given the history of play h t 1 and the resulting TU game in place (N; v t;x t 1 ), players play the game G(N; v t;x t 1 ) with the order of responders determined by t h t 1 : The outcome of this period determines the veto balanced TU game for the next period, (N; v t+1;x t ), where v t+1;x t (S) := max f0; min fv t (N ) x t (N ); v t (S) x t (S)gg and x t is the …nal outcome obtained in period t. Then go to the next step.
3. The game ends after stage n of period T: (If at some period before T the proposer makes an e¢ cient proposal (e¢ cient according to the TU game underlying at this period) the game is trivial for the rest of the periods).
4. The outcome is the sum of the outcomes generated at each period, that is, x := P T t=1 x t .
A serial rule for veto balanced games
We now introduce a solution concept de…ned on the class of veto balanced games and denoted by . Somewhat surprisingly, this solution will be related to the non-cooperative game with sequential proposals. 6 Our de…nition ensures that v ; 2) x 1 (1; 2) we would obtain 10 2 = 8, but this would be infeasible.
Let (N; v) be a veto balanced game where player 1 is a veto player. De…ne for each player i a value d i as follows:
Because 1 is a veto player, d 1 = 0: Let d n+1 := v(N ) and rename the remaining players according to the nondecreasing order of those values. That is, player 2 is the player with the lowest value and so on. The solution associates to each veto balanced game, (N; v), the following payo¤ vector:
for all l 2 f1; :::; ng :
The following example illustrates how the solution behaves. Applying the formula,
The formula suggests a serial rule principle (cf. Moulin and Shenker, 1992 ). Since it is not possible for any coalition to obtain a payo¤ above d i without player i's cooperation, we can view player i as having a right over
:::; v(N ) d n ) and each payo¤ segment is divided equally among the players that have a right over it.
In the class of veto balanced games, the solution satis…es some wellknown properties such as nonemptiness, e¢ ciency, anonymity and equal treatment of equals among others. It also satis…es aggregate monotonicity. 7 The next section shows that (N; v) is the unique equilibrium outcome assuming that all responders act as myopic maximizers and the proposer plays optimally taking this into account.
Myopic Best Response Equilibrium
We start our analysis of the non-cooperative game with sequential proposals by assuming myopic behavior on the part of responders. Responders behave myopically when they act as payo¤ maximizers in each period without considering the e¤ect of their actions on future periods.
Suppose all responders maximize payo¤s myopically for each period and that the proposer plays optimally taking into account that the responders are myopic maximizers. Formally, player i 6 = 1 maximizes x t i at each period t whereas player 1 maximizes P T t=1 x t 1 . We call such a strategy pro…le a myopic best response equilibrium (MBRE). We will show in this section that all MBRE lead to the same outcome, namely the serial rule.
In order to show this result, we introduce the concept of balanced proposals, which are proposals that emerge as the …nal outcome regardless of whether they are accepted or rejected by the responders. We then show that any payo¤ the proposer can attain under myopic behavior of the responders can also be attained by making balanced proposals: player 1 can cut the payo¤ of other players until a balanced proposal is obtained at no cost to himself (lemma 4). Hence, from the proposer's point of view there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to balanced proposals. We will then show that the highest payo¤ the proposer can achieve with balanced proposals is 1 . Finally, we will show that the only way in which the proposer can achieve 1 requires all players to get their component of the serial rule, so that the only MBRE outcome is (N; v) .
Note that the property of balancedness in a proposal holds or fails to hold for all possible orders of the responders. Because of this, the results in this section hold for any order of moves of the responders.
Our main motivation for the use of MBRE is its simplicity. Beyond that, it can be justi…ed as modelling cautious behavior on the part of the responders. If the responders are not certain of other players'rationality, they may choose to maximize payo¤s for the current period without trying to anticipate other players'future behavior. What if we assume similarly cautious behavior on the part of the proposer? This would lead us to the concept of balanced proposals. Hence, in a MBRE with balanced proposals all players are playing cautiously. Our results on MBRE and balanced proposals indicate that it is enough that one of the sides (proposer or responders) is acting cautiously in order to obtain the serial rule.
Balanced proposals
The notion of balanced proposals will play a central role in the analysis of MBRE.
De…nition 1 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game, and G T (N; v) its associated extensive form game. Given a period t; a proposal x is balanced if it is the …nal outcome of period t regardless of the actions of the responders.
Balanced proposals coincide with the nucleolus (kernel) of special games. In the class of veto-rich games (games with at least one veto player and a nonempty set of imputations) the kernel and the nucleolus coincide (Arin and Feltkamp, 1997 ). Therefore we can de…ne the nucleolus as
We use this alternative de…nition of the nucleolus in the proof of the following lemma. Proof (2007) shows that if the bilateral kernel conditions are satis…ed between the veto player and the rest of the players then the bilateral kernel conditions are satis…ed between any pair of players.
Therefore, x t is the kernel (nucleolus) of the game (N; w t ): The converse statement can be proven in the same way.
Balanced proposals and MBRE
If there is only one period in the game, myopic and rational behavior coincide. This means that the following lemma holds if responders behave myopically. (N; v) be a veto balanced game. Consider the associated game with T periods G T (N; v) . Let z = P T t=1 x t be the outcome resulting from an arbitrary strategy pro…le. Assume that the …nal outcome of any period t, x t , is such that for any player i, x t i f 1i (x t ; v t ). Then there exists y such that y 1 = z 1 , y = P T t=1 q t where q t is a balanced proposal for period t.
Lemma 4 Let
Proof. If (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x T ) is a sequence of balanced proposals the proof is done.
Suppose that (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x T ) is not a sequence of balanced proposals. This means that for some x t and for some i 6 = 1 it holds that x t i > f 1i (x t ; v t ) and x t i > 0: Let k be the …rst period where such result holds. Therefore, (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x k 1 ) is a sequence of balanced proposals. We will construct a balanced proposal where the payo¤ of the proposer does not change.
Since
; by reducing the payo¤ of player i we can construct a new allocation y
and the payo¤ of the proposer does not change. Note also that reducing i's payo¤ cannot increase f 1j (y k ), so it is still the case that f 1j (y k ) f j1 (y k ) for all j. Now, if there exists another player l such that f 1l (y k ) < f l1 (y k ) and y
Repeating this procedure we will end up with a balanced allocation q k . The TU game (N; w k+1 ) resulting after proposing q k satis…es that w k+1 (S) v k+1 (S) for all S 3 1: Therefore, f 1i (x k+1 ; w k+1 ) f 1i (x k+1 ; v k+1 ), and x k+1 l f 1l (x k+1 ; w k+1 ) for all l. Consider the game (N; w k+1 ) and the payo¤ x k+1 . Suppose that
) for some i 6 = 1 and x k+1 i > 0: We can repeat the same procedure of period k until we obtain a balanced allocation q k+1 . The procedure can be repeated until the last period of the game to obtain the sequence of balanced proposals (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x k 1 ; q k ; :::; q T ).
Corollary 1 A proposer's payo¤ z 1 is achievable under myopic behavior of the responders if and only if it is achievable by balanced proposals.
If responders behave myopically, the proposer has a sequence of balanced proposals that yields the same proposer's payo¤ (lemmas 3 and 4). The converse statement is trivial: if a payo¤ is achievable by balanced proposals, it is achievable under any assumptions about responders'behavior including myopic behavior.
The serial rule can be achieved with balanced proposals
We now show that, by making balanced proposals, the proposer can secure the payo¤ provided by the serial rule . Note that the assumption T n is crucial for this result.
Lemma 5 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and G T (N; v) its associated extensive form game with T n. The proposer has a sequence of balanced proposals that leads to (N; v):
Proof. The sequence consists of n balanced proposals. At each period t; (t 2 f1; :::; ng) consider the set S t = fl : l tg and the proposal x t , de…ned as follows:
for all l 2 S t 0 otherwise. whenever x t is feasible and propose the 0 vector otherwise. It can be checked immediately that in each period the proposed allocation will be the …nal allocation independently of the answers of the responders and independently of the order of those answers. The proposals are balanced proposals.
For example, in period 1, the proposal is (d 2 ; 0; :::; 0). Because 1 is a veto player, f i1 (:) = 0 for all i. As for f 1i (:), because all players other than 1 are getting 0, the coalition of minimum satisfaction of 1 against i is also the coalition of maximum v(S) with i = 2 S. Call this coalition S . By de…nition,
for all i and the outcome of period 1 is (d 2 ; 0; :::; 0) regardless of responders' behavior.
In period 2 we have a game v 2 with the property that 0 = f 21 (:). As for other players i 6 = 1; 2, when computing f 1i we take into account that any coalition of positive value must include 1 and 2. Since players other than 1 and 2 are getting 0, the coalition 1 uses against i is S 2 arg max
In period 3, player 3 has become a veto player and the same process can be iterated until period n.
Therefore, this strategy of the proposer determines the total payo¤ of all the players, that is, the …nal outcome of the game G T (N; v): This …nal outcome coincides with the solution :
Remark 1
The serial rule can also be obtained by making balanced proposals if the game has n 1 periods. This is because the proposer can combine the …rst two proposals in the proof of lemma 5 by proposing
; 0; :::; 0) in the …rst period. The proof of lemma 5, together with lemma 2, suggests a new interpretation of the serial rule. At each period the proposal coincides with the nucleolus of a veto-rich game. Formally,
Remark 2
The serial rule is the sum of the nucleolus allocations of n auxiliary games, namely
where the games (N; w t ) are de…ned as follows: w 1 (N ) = d 2 and w 1 (S) = v(S) otherwise. For i : 2; ::; n :
This interpretation of the serial rule provides a better understanding of the connection between the serial rule and the model with sequential proposals. In the one-period game the kernel (nucleolus) of the veto game is a natural candidate to be a Nash outcome of the noncooperative model since it satis…es the bilateral principle that is applied in the event of disagreement; in many cases this intuition is con…rmed (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007) . In contrast, the model with n periods leads to the serial rule, an apparently unrelated solution concept. However, since the nucleolus of an auxiliary game is obtained in each period, the outcome of the n-period game is not incongruent with the outcome of the one-period game. Proof. As we have seen, 1 (N; v) coincides with the MBRE payo¤ for the proposer in the game G T (N; v) when T n 1. This payo¤ is at least as large as his equilibrium payo¤ in the game G 1 (N; v) , because the proposer can always wait until period T to divide the payo¤. This equilibrium payo¤ is in turn at least as high as 1 (N; v), because (N; v) is a balanced proposal.
MBRE and SPE may not coincide
The next example illustrates that a MBRE need not be a subgame perfect equilibrium. = 121=6: As we know from the previous section, this is player 1's payo¤ in any MBRE for any order of the responders. Suppose the order of responders is 2, 3, 4, 5. The following result holds given this order: If the responders play the game optimally (not necessarily as myopic maximizers) the proposer can get a higher payo¤ than the one provided by the MBRE outcome. Therefore, MBRE and SPE outcomes do not necessarily coincide.
The strategy is the following: The proposer o¤ers nothing in the …rst three periods. In the 4th period the proposal is: (10; 10; 5; 0; 0):
The responses of players 2, 4 and 5 do not change the proposal (even if the proposal faced by player 4 and 5 is a new one resulting from a rejection of player 3). If player 3 accepts this proposal, the TU game for the last period will be:
11 if S 2 ff1; 2; 3; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 5gg 11 if S = f1; 2; 4; 5g 26 if S = N 0 otherwise.
In the last period, myopic and rational behavior coincide, so the outcome must be an element of B 1 (N; w): It can be checked that B 1 (N; w) = f(5:5; 5:5; 0; 0; 0)g : Therefore, after accepting the proposal in period 4, player 3 gets a total payo¤ of 5:
If player 3 rejects the proposal, the outcome of the 4th period is (15; 10; 0; 0; 0) and the TU game for the last period is:
11 if S 2 ff1; 2; 3; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 5gg 6 if S = f1; 2; 4; 5g 26
if S = N 0 otherwise.
As before, in the last period myopic and rational behavior coincide and the outcome must be an element of B 1 (N; u): It can be checked that B 1 (N; u) = f(5:2; 5:2; 5:2; 5:2; 5:2)g : Therefore, after rejecting the proposal player 3 gets a total payo¤ of 5:2:
Therefore, rational behavior of player 3 implies a rejection of the proposal in the 4th period. This rejection is not a myopic maximizer's behavior. After the rejection of player 3 the proposer gets a payo¤ of 20:2, higher than 121=6. Hence, the outcome associated to MBRE is not the outcome of an SPE.
In the example above, the proposer …nds a credible way to collude with player 3 in order to get a higher payo¤ than the one obtained by player 2 (a veto player). Player 2 cannot avoid this collusion since he is responding before player 3. If he responded after player 3, collusion between players 1 and 3 would no longer be pro…table. This observation turns out to be crucial as we will see in the next section.
The serial rule as an SPE outcome
The previous example shows that, in general, myopic and rational behavior do not coincide. However, they do coincide when the model incorporates a requirement on the order of the responders. We will assume in theorem 3 that stronger responders must move after weaker responders. Formally, denote the d value for player i in v t as d 
Concluding remarks
We have studied a bargaining procedure with a distinguished player and an enforceable bilateral principle in case of disagreement. The nucleolus is the only e¢ cient allocation that satis…es this bilateral principle, but it does not always emerge as an equilibrium outcome because the proposer may prefer to make an ine¢ cient proposal. We then introduced the possibility of renegotiation through additional periods of bargaining and showed that it leads to an e¢ cient outcome, namely the serial rule. As a byproduct of the analysis, we uncovered a relationship between the serial rule and the nucleolus: the serial rule is the sum of n allocations, each of which is the nucleolus of an auxiliary game.
We have shown that any SPE outcome of our bargaining procedure is achievable with myopic behavior of the responders if responders move by increasing strength (lemma 14 in the Appendix). This result is independent of the number of periods. If there are at least n 1 periods, the only SPE outcome is the serial rule: the proposer is always able to obtain 1 (N; v) by making balanced proposals, and the only way to obtain this payo¤ is if all other players get i (N; v) as well. If there are fewer than n 1 periods, there may not be enough periods for the proposer to achieve the serial rule with balanced proposals. If z is an SPE outcome, it is still true that the proposer can obtain z 1 by making balanced proposals, hence all SPE outcomes must have the same z 1 , but there may be several SPE outcomes if z 1 < 1 (N; v) .
Our paper is closely related to Dagan et al. (1997) in that both papers are based on bilateral bargaining with a certain bilateral principle being enforced in the event of disagreement. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental di¤erence with this and other papers (e.g. Chun (1989) , Herrero et al. (2010) and Karagözo¼ glu (2014)) that makes it di¢ cult to relate our paper to the literature on noncooperative models of bankruptcy: our bargaining procedure does not feature an exogenous vector of claims (c i ) i2N . The values v(N ) d i could be considered analogous to claims, but note that they are not an exogenous element of the model (they just happen to play an important role in equilibrium) and there is no suggestion that player i is entitled to receive the entire v(N ) d i , just that achieving a payo¤ above d i would require player i's consent so that player i has a veto right over v(N ) d i . However, it is worth noting that, if we de…ne c i := v(N ) d i , the serial rule coincides with Ibn Ezra's solution as described by O'Neill (1982).
Appendix
Proof of theorem 2
We have already shown that (N; v) can be achieved with balanced proposals. It remains to show that the proposer cannot improve upon . Let z = P T t=1 x t be an outcome resulting from balanced proposals. Our objective is to show that z 1 1 implies z i i for all i. This result, together with the e¢ ciency of the serial rule, leads to z = being the unique MBRE outcome. We start by establishing the result not for the original game (N; v), but for the sequence of auxiliary games (N; w t ) (lemma 9). We then check that the sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game (N; v) (lemma 10).
We start with the following property of balanced proposals:
Lemma 6 If x t is a balanced proposal, any player i with x to complain against k). Hence,
, where the last equality follows from lemma 6. . Since x t is balanced, f 1k (x t ; v t ) 0. Let P be a coalition associated to f 1k (x t ; v t ). Because f 1k (x t ; v t ) 0, x t (P ) v t (P ). Coalition P must contain all players receiving a positive payo¤ at x t (otherwise x t is not balanced since P can be used against any player outside P ). Therefore x t (N ) = x t (P ) v t (P ). Because of the way w t is de…ned it cannot exceed x t (N ), so x t (N ) = w t (P ) = d k (w t ) and k receives 0 according to the serial rule of w t . The following lemma concerns a property of the serial rule. By de…nition, the serial rule is such that d k is divided among players fj 2 N; j < kg. Above d k , player k and any player j < k get the same payo¤. The next lemma tell us that, given a strategy pro…le with balanced proposals, the proposer cannot get more than the serial rule of the games w t .
Lemma 9 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game. Consider the associated game with T periods
This corollary follows directly from lemma 9 and the e¢ ciency of the serial rule. Lemma 9 states that x t 1 1 (N; w t ) implies x t l l (N; w t ) for all l 2 N . By de…nition of w t , P l2N x t l = w t (N ). By the e¢ ciency of the serial rule, P l2N l (N; w t ) = w t (N ). Hence, the only way in which player 1 can obtain the serial rule of (N; w t ) with balanced proposals is that all players in the game obtain their serial rule payo¤.
Finally, the sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game. This is due to the following property of the serial rule: 
Sketch of proof.
In the lemma, we take v(N ) and divide it in k positive parts, where k is a …nite number. We then compute the serial rule for each of the k games, and see that each player gets the same in total as in the serial rule of the original game. The k games are formed as follows: w l (N ) is always a l for each l : 1; :::; k; the other coalitions have v(S) minus what has been distributed so far according to the serial rule of the previous games, unless this would be negative (in which case the value is 0) or above w l (N ) (in which case the value is a l ). Denote by d 2 ) will be a veto player from w 3 onwards. Let l be the …rst auxiliary game for which a 1 + ::: + a l > d i . At this point, the value of any coalition S associated to d i is w l (S) = min(v(S) P l 1 t=1 a t ; a l ) = v(S)
will still be divided between the other players, but above that value player i will receive a share. Note that
Hence, player i …nds that d i is divided (not necessarily equally) between players with a lower index. Any player with j (N; w l ) > 0 must have d l j < a l , and thus must belong to any coalition T such that v(T ) P l 1 t=1 a t > a l . Hence, any T with w l+1 (T ) > 0 will have w l+1 (T ) = min(v(T ) P l t=1 a t ; a l+1 ) and any j with j (N; w l ) > 0 -including player i-will be a veto player from w l+1 onwards and will therefore receive a share of the payo¤.
We see that players receive a positive share if and only if d i has already been distributed. Above d i , the serial rules of the auxiliary games ensure that the payo¤ is evenly divided between the players who are getting a positive share. This process replicates the serial rule of the original game. For the same reason, if P k l=1 a l < v(N ); the proposer will get less than 1 (N; v). Note that lemma 10 refers to a sequence of TU games such that each game is obtained after distributing the serial rule payo¤s for the previous game; the games w t in lemma 9 are obtained by subtracting balanced proposals from w t 1 . It turns out that the TU games involved are identical in both cases: the sequence w t depends only on the total amounts distributed x 1 (N ); :::; x T (N ) (denoted by a 1 , ..., a k in lemma 10 ). This is because the set of players that get a positive payo¤ at period t is the same in both cases (lemma 7) and all these players become veto players at period t + 1 (lemma 6). Hence, any coalition with positive value at t has w t (S) = min(w t 1 (S) x t 1 (N ); x t (N )) in both cases.
Putting the above lemmas together we can prove theorem 2. First, any payo¤ player 1 can achieve in a MBRE can be achieved by balanced proposals (lemma 4). Second, given that proposals are balanced, the payo¤ player 1 can get cannot exceed the sum of the serial rules of the games w t (lemma 9). Since the sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game (lemma 10), player 1 can never get more than 1 (N; v) in a MBRE. Also, player 1 can only get 1 (N; v) if all other players get their serial rule payo¤ (corollary 3). Finally, (N; v) is achievable by the sequential proposals described in lemma 5.
Note that the assumption T n only plays a role in lemma 5. For time horizons shorter than n 1, all auxiliary results still hold but player 1 may not be able to achieve a payo¤ as high as 1 (N; v):
Proof of theorem 3
We start by pointing out some immediate consequences of the results in section 3.3. Suppose to the contrary that there is an SPE outcome z that di¤ers from (N; v) and can be achieved by balanced proposals. If z di¤ers from (N; v), z 1 1 (N; v) (otherwise the proposer would prefer to play the strategy described in lemma 5, which is available since T n). If z is achievable by balanced proposals, it is (trivially) achievable under myopic responder behavior. However, under myopic behavior of the responders, the proposer can only achieve at least 1 (N; v) if all players are getting their serial rule payo¤s, that is, if z = (N; v) (theorem 2), a contradiction. Lemma 11 Suppose after player i responds to the proposal in period t it holds that f 1i (x t;i ; v t ) > 0. Then f 1i (x t ; v t ) > 0 regardless of the responses of the players moving after i.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that f 1i (x t ; v t ) 0. This means that at the end of period t there is a coalition S such that i = 2 S and v t (S ) x t (S ). Because f 1i (x t;i ; v t ) > 0 immediately after i responds to the proposal, all coalitions excluding i had a positive satisfaction at that point, and in particular v t (S ) < x t;i (S ). There must be a player h moving after i such that h = 2 S and h has received a payo¤ transfer from player 1 by rejecting the proposal. At the moment of rejection by h we have f 1h (x t;h ; v t ) = x t h > 0. However, since S can be used by 1 to complain against h, at the end of period t we have f 1h (x t ; v t ) 0. There must be another player l moving after h that has received a payo¤ transfer from player 1, and this player cannot be in S : Then this player is in the same situation as player h: he has f 1l (x t;l ; v t ) > 0 at the moment of rejection, but at the end of period t he has f 1l (x t ; v t ) 0. Thus there must be another player moving after him that has caused this change and would himself be in the same situation as player h... but the number of players is …nite.
Note that lemma 11 holds for any strategy pro…le, not necessarily an equilibrium.
The next auxiliary result will allow us to compare the equilibria of games with di¤erent characteristic functions. If one of the characteristic functions is "worse" than the other (in the sense of having lower values), player 1 might still have a greater SPE payo¤, but only with nonmyopic responder behavior. Proof. Suppose on the contrary that z 1 cannot be obtained with balanced proposals. By Lemma 4 we know that there is a player k and a stage t such that f 1k (x t ; v t ) > x t k 0; otherwise the proposer can obtain z 1 with balanced proposals.
Let t be the last period 14 in which for some responder it holds that f 1k (x t ; v t ) > x
For any player i it holds that f 1i (yThe game v R;t+1 is better than the game v A;t+1 (in the sense of lemma 12). If v A;t+1 (S) > 0, coalition S must contain all players in f1; 2; :::; pg. For this kind of coalition v R;t+1 (S) = v A;t+1 (S), since any payo¤ transfers after rejection occur between members of f1; :::; pg (here the order of moves is essential). Thus, v A;t+1 (S) v R;t+1 (S) for all S. We now show that p is also veto at t + 1 on the R-path. Suppose p is not veto at t + 1 on the R-path. Then there is a coalition S p such that p = 2 S p and v R;t+1 (S p ) > 0. This can only happen if v R;t (S p ) > x R;t (S p ), or equivalently f 1p (x R;t ; v t ) < 0, contradicting lemma 11. Thus, player p is a veto player at t + 1 regardless of whether he accepts or rejects the proposal. Given the order of moves, veto players can secure at least the same payo¤ as the proposer. There is no reason for veto players to act nonmyopically because the game at t + 2 will be the same regardless of how the payo¤ is distributed at t + 1 between veto players; no payo¤ can go to anyone else given the order of responders. For the same reason the proposer will never make a proposal that gives another veto player more than he gets himself, so that all veto players must get the same payo¤ given the order of moves. Let y R 1 be player 1's payo¤ if p rejects the proposal (this is the payo¤ accumulated between periods t + 1 and n) and y for some i. By assumption this is not the case. Thus, it was not in p's interest to accept: rejecting would yield a higher payo¤ at t, and at least the same payo¤ in the rest of the game.
b2) The last player to act nonmyopically at t has rejected a proposal. Let p be the last player to act nonmyopically at t. This player cannot be player k because after any rejection (myopic or otherwise) it holds that f 1k (:) x rejects the proposal, and the subgame o¤ the equilibrium path in which p
